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TO CATCH A HERETIC:
AUGUSTINE ON LYING
William E. Mann

Augustine devoted two treatises to the topic of lying, De Mendacio and Contra
Mendacium ad Consentium. The treatises raise interesting questions about what
lying is while defending the thesis that all lies are sinful. The first part of this
essay offers an interpretation of Augustine's attenlpts at definition. The second part exanlines his argunlents for the sinfulness of lying used to trap
heretics and for the nlore general thesis that alllying is sinful.

"Tell me, then: what do you believe?"
"My lord, 1believe everything a good Christian should...."
"A holy reply! And what does a good Christian believe?"
"What the holy church teaches."
"And which holy church? The church that is so considered by
those believers who call themselves perfect, the Pseudo Apostles, the
heretical Fraticelli, or the church they compare to the whore of
Babyion, in which all of us devoutly believe?"
"My lord," the cellarer said, bewildered, "tell me which you
believe is the true church. . . ."
"I believe it is the Roman church, one, holy, and apostolic, govemed by the Pope and his bishops."
"So 1believe," the cellarer said.
"Admirable shrewdness!" the inquisitor cried. "Admirable cleverness de dicto. Y ou all heard him: he means to say he believes that 1
believe in this church, and he evades the requirement of what he
believes in!"
Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose
The implacable Bemard Gui knows the wiles of heretics. Remigio the cellarer, the heretic Gui seeks to expose, will do almost anything to avoid
telling a lie. Remigio attempts to exploit an ambiguity. One implication of
"So 1 believe" is "I believe the same thing." Remigio indeed intends his
audience to interpret his utterance in that way. But what the utterance really conveys, by Remigio's lights, is his endorsement, not of the content of
Gui's belief, but of the sincerity of Gui'sexpression of it.
The dialogue is fictional; Bemard Gui is not. Gui really was a Dominican
inquisitor, pressed into fictional service in Eco's tale of fourteenth-cenlury
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intrigue. And although the dialogue is fictional, it is not a pure flight of
fancy. It captures what could have transpired between a wily heretic and a
shrewd inquisitor. Remigio's tactic is a specimen of what was called, naturally enough, "equivocation."l The tactic is in service of astrategy, which
might be expressed as follows: 00 not lie in order to conceal the truth if
you can mislead your adversary by other, evasive means. The strategy in
turn is sanctioned by the principle that lying is always, without exception,
morally wrong, whereas certain kinds of evasive techniques can be right,
wrong, or morally neutral, depending on the circumstances. (One such
technique, for example, is to answer a question with a question or request,
as when Remigio says, "Tell me which you believe is the true church.")
Eco's dialogue does not happen to illustrate this constraint as it applies
to Gui. But no inquisitor of Gui's stature could have failed to be aware of
and obedient to the doctrine against lying laid out in Augusline's Contra
Mendacium ad Consentium (hereinafter referred to as 'CM'). The work was
written in 422 to address the issue whether it was permissible to use
entrapment techniques to identify Priscillianists, a heretical sect with
Manichaean leanings. Augustine's opinion is a resoundingly clear endorsement of the principle that lying is always wrong, even when---especially
when---employed to smoke out heretics.
Although Augustine makes it abundantly clear in CM and in his earlier
De Mendacio (hereinafter, 'DM')2 that he subscribes to the principle that
lying is always wrong, he is less forthcoming about why lying is wrong.
Nor, I shall argue, does he supply a clear account of what lying is, in distinction from other kinds of deceptive practices. These two projects, justification of the principle and definition of the concept, are not unrelated. It
might be, for instance, that if one delimits the notion of a lie narrowly
enough, one will thereby make defense of the principle easier. I shall begin
by surveying Augustine's remarks on definition.

What Are Lies?
Here is a trio of passages, two from DM and one from CM. The translations
are subject to modification as we proceed.
(A) In DM 3.3 Augustine allows that just as a person who says what is
false may not be lying, so long as she believes that what she says is true, so
a person who tells the tnlth may nonetheless be lying/ if he believes that
what he is saying is false. As if in anticipation of our incredulous stares
regarding the second claim, Augustine hastens to add: "For he is to be
judged as lying or not lying by the intention (sententia) of his own soul, not
by the truth or falsity of the things themselves."
(B) In DM 4.5 Augustine says that "No one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the purpose of deceiving (causa fallendi)," and
that therefore it is obvious that a lie is a "false statement put forward with a
will to deceive (enuntiatem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatum)." He
then immediately adds, "But whether this alone is a lie, is another question."
(C) In CM 12.26 Augustine says that a lie is a "false signification with a
will to deceive" (falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi).
The first thing that may strike the reader of these passages is that they
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appear to be inconsistent. (B) and (C) comport with each other weIl
enough. Their separation in composition by twenty-six years makes a
strong case for saying that they represent Augustine's settled opinion on
the matter. The odd one out is (A). We could try to admit (B) and (C) as
part of the Augustinian canon and dismiss (A) as an aberration, were it not
for the fact that (A) is located in such close proximity to (B), separated from
it by approximately four standard-size pages. To dismiss (A) we would
have to suppose not merely that Augustine nodded but that he fell asleep
at the wheel. The last sentence of (B) throws out a bit of an interpretative
lifeline. It encourages us to think that although a false statement put forward with a will to deceive is the paradigm or most salient case of a lie,
there may be other cases of lying that do not fit that mold. Perhaps then the
kind of case described in (A) can be tolerated. However, (A) does not just
nibble at the periphery of the opinion put forward in (B) and (C). The case
described in (A) flouts one-half of what (B) and (C) maintain, namely, that
a lie involves a false statement or signification.
There is a way of harmonizing the three passages. The way 1 am going
to suggest will also help us to see the rationale behind Augustine's position
that lying is always wrong.
The first thing to do is to examine more closely the translations in (B)
and (C). Both of them make cmcial use of the term, voluntas. 1 have translated it as 'will', a term that descends etymologically from the Latin volo.
The problem is that voluntas is as ambiguous in Latin as 'will' is in English.
A will to deceive can simply be adesire to deceive, and that is how the
translators of DM and CM in the Fathers of the Church series have chosen to
translate voluntas in (B) and (C).3 On this translation, then, Augustine's definition of a lie is this:
(Dl) A He is a false statement put forward with adesire to deceive.
(D1) is a definition whose deficieney can be demonstrated by means of
examples that Augustine hirnself provides. 5uppose that 1 were to tell you
that Burlington is the capital of Vermont under the following circumstances. (1) What 1 say is false: Vermont's capital is Montpelier. (2) 1 sincerely believe that BurHngton is the capital. (3) 1 indeed have adesire to
deceive you but, ashamed by the baseness of that desire, 1 came to have a
stronger desire not to deceive you, and it was the stronger desire that triggered my utterance. Now if just conditions (1) and (2) appHed in this case, 1
think we would agree that although 1 misinformed you, 1 did not He. (1
may still be guilty of other lapses in this case, such as speaking too confidentlyon the basis of insufficient research.) The addition of condition (3)
does not alter the verdict. The operative desire was the desire not to
deceive, even though, seething cauldron of conflicling passions that 1 am,
the desire to deceive persisted. The desire to deceive accompanied my false
statement, yet 1 did not lie. So the definition of a He as a false statement put
forward with adesire to deceive is inadequate.
Nor is there an obvious patch that repairs the definition. The one most
likely to suggest itself is this:

482

Faith and Philosophy

(D2) A lie is a false statement effectively motivated by adesire to
deceive.
What (D2) maintains is that for an utterance to count as a lie, the desire to
deceive must be in the driver's seat, so to speak; it must be the desire one
would correctly cite in answer to the question, "What prompted her to say
that?" Now the problem with (D2) is that many lies are not so motivated.
Augustine knows this very welle He supplies us with a rich variety of
counterexamples to the thesis that lies must be effectively motivated by a
desire to deceive. A person can lie in circumstances in which the effective
desire is adesire to seek someone else's salvation (DM 8.11 and CM passim), or to conceal one's religious, moral or political convictions in a hostile
society (CM 2.2), or to prevent someone else from cornmitting greater sins
(CM 9.20), or to protect the innocent (CM 10.23 and 15.32), or to keep a
shocking truth from someone who will not be able to bear it (CM 18.36).
We can press this line of thought further. In DM 11.18 Augustine distinguishes the mentiens from the mendax. Call them, respectively, the raconteur and the mythomaniac. The raconteur lies reluctantly, that is, she has
no desire to lie, and would prefer to tell the truth, but she also prefers
pleasing h.er listeners with harmless lies over remaining silent. In contrast
the mythomaniac "truly loves to lie and frequently indulges his soul in the
pleasure of lying." There are two points worthy of note here. First, the
raconteur's lying conflicts with what she most wants to do, namely, please
her listeners by telling them truths. Since she cannot pIease them by telling
them truths, pleasing them by lying is, by her lights, the next best thing.
Augustine's claim about reluctance generalizes: we can say on his behalf
that an agent acts reluctantly whenever she does what she does not most
want to do. This conception of reluctance is at odds, to be sure, with a
maneuver in apriori psychology that maintains that in general, whatever
people do is what they most want to do; otherwise they would not do it.
Thus because the raconteur did tell lies, telling lies must be what she most
wanted to do. I see nothing to commend this maneuver. Centuries after
Augustine's time but in the spirit of Augustine's moral psychology, Peter
Abelard pointed out that inferences like 'She wanted to lie from adesire to
please her audience; therefore she wanted to lie' are invalid. She need have
no desire to lie, a fortiori no effective desire to lie. She may very well regard
her lying as something she must endure in order to achieve what she really
does want, namely, the attention and admiration of her audience. 4
Many cases of lying will thus be cases of reluctant lying; many of them
will be tinged with regret that some other course of action was unavailable
or even more unacceptable. But perhaps not alle For-this is the second
point-the mythomaniac lies whole-heartedly: if anybody fills the bill of
lying effectively motivated by adesire to deceive, it will be the mythomamac. Surely, however, the genuine mythomaniac is or is close to being a
psychopath. Till Eulenspiegel and Don Juan are literary approximations.
But if we have to scour the resources of legend to find our best examples,
that suggests that the phenomenon of lying effectively motivated by a
desire to deceive may not be all that common, certainly not as common as
lying reluctantly.
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I suggest, then, that we do Augustine a disservice by translating voluntas
as 'desire' . That translation requires us to suppose not only that
Augustine's attempt at definition fails but that Augustine hirnself obligingly supplies us with the materials necessary to chart its failure. We search in
the wrong place if we rummage through the closet of desires in an attempt
to locate a definition of lying. I want to argue for an altemative translation
of voluntas, one that makes a stronger case for Augustine. Voluntas can also
mean 'intention'. Under that translation Augustine's definition is this:
(D3) A lie is a false statement put forward with an intention to
deceive.
How does this help? It can help only if there is some significant philosophical difference between desires and intentions. And there iso Our
desires come to us unbidden (but not necessarily unwelcome). We generally have no more direct voluntary control over them than we do over our
ordinary beliefs. Just as my beliefs can be inconsistent, my desires can conflict with each other: the satisfaction of one can logically preclude the satisfaction of others. In contrast, many intentions are arrived at voluntarily.
And although desire-conflict betokens merely a less than optimal psychic
order, a conflict of intentions would be a symptom of a breakdown of
rationality. You can understand someone who says "I want to <p and I want
not to <pli ("I want to have the creme brulee and I want not to have the
creme bn1lee"). That is the stuff of which human frailty is made. Now try
to fathom what could be going on intemally with someone who said, in all
seriousness, "I intend to <p and I intend not to <p." One might be able to
interpret this diachronically, as "I intend to <p and then I intend not to <p" ("I
intend to live the life of a wastrel until 30; I intend after that to put aside
my prodigal ways"). But if the avowal is interpreted synchronically, its
speaker beggars comprehension.
The reason for the lack of parallel between conflicting desires and conflicting intentions is not far afield. Our garden-variety desires, like our garden-variety perceptual beliefs, are more or less just there, taking up residence in our psyches. We do not fabricate them so much as we find them.
(Of course some desires are not garden-variety but rather the product of
cultivation, such as a preference for Cabemet Sauvignon over Merlot. But
then so are some perceptual beliefs, like the belief that the painting before
me is an early Monet.) OLlr intentions, however, are more the product of
fabrication. Our desires are an essential building material: it is hard to see
how a being who had no desires whatsoever could have any intentions.
Intentions are not merely fancy (or fancier) desires. They are more like
plans of action whose function is to satisfy some desires (or, in the unhappy dispensation, to thwart some desires), plans that the agent will act on if
the circumstances are right.
Augustine saw this clearly by the time he came to write DM. In De
Sermone Domini in Monte, written two years before DM, he introduced a
trio of concepts, suggestion, pleasure, and consent, that he regarded as critical to the analysis of sin. s A suggestion is a representation in a person's
mind, quite often brought aboLlt by some extemal set of circumstances. The
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representation is of some possible state of affairs whose actualization
would typically involve the person's agency. The person may or may not
take pleasure in the suggestion. It is at this point that desires will arise. To
consent to the suggestion is to intend to bring about its associated state of
affairs should the opportunity arise (De Sermone Domini in Monte 1.12.34).
This conceptual apparatus provides good reason for accepting the intentional translation of voluntas, thereby imputing to Augustine definition
(03). But there is more work to be done if we are to determine whether the
definition is acceptable to us and to Augustine.
It is useful to compare Augustine's fifth-century (03) with a twenty-first
century definition:
(04) A lie is "an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes
to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer
with regard to that content."6
Augustine's (03) and Williams's (04) converge on the importance of an
intention to deceive. They diverge on two other points. First, (03) specifies
that the statement must be false and is silent on the question wheth.er the
speaker must believe the statement to be false. (04) focuses on the speaker's belief to the exclusion of the truth-value of the statement. Second, (03)
simply refers to an intention to deceive that accompanies the false statement. (04) explicitly ties the intention to the content of the statement.
Consider th.e first difference first. For all that (03) says, it might seem
that the speaker could believe of the false statement that it is true. Or is this
not even a possibility, given that the speaker is bent on deception? In analogous fashion, for all that (04) says, the assertion that the speaker believes
to be false might be true. Has the speaker then failed to lie, contrary to his
intention? We can and perhaps should ring the changes here on the truthvalue of the statement and the speaker's belief about the statement in order
to test (03) and (04). Let us set aside cases in which the speaker has no
doxastic attitude vis-a-vis the statement,? and consider just those cases in
which the speaker either believes that the statement is true or believes that
the statement is false. And let us hold fixed the assumption that the speaker intends to deceive the hearer, allowing for the intention, however, to be
articulated further in light of the cases. Finally, let us press into service the
hapless Remigio. There are, then, four possibilities open to Remigio:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

The statement is true and Remigio believes that the statement is
true.
The statement is true and Remigio believes that the statement is
false.
The statement is false and Remigio believes that the statement
is true.
The statement is false and Remigio believes that the statement
is false.
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For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to (1)-(4) almost always as cases
though they are, more strictly speaking, types of cases. Case (4), about
which little needs to be said, is the standard case of a lie. Let us turn our
attention to cases (1) and (3). They are startling in that they suppose that
Remigio, who has set out on a path of deception, believes that the statement being used, the vehicle of that deception, is true. A non-startling
hypothesis that shows the possibility of a type-(l) case is case (1'): Remigio
utters a true statement, say, "Montpellier is the capital of Herault," to a
hearer who Remigio believes distrusts him. Remigio counts on the distrust
leading the hearer to come to believe that Montpellier is not the capital of
Herault. 8 Another non-startling hypothesis that would exemplify cases (1)
and (3) is that Remigio is employing a relatively long-range strategy to
overcome the present suspicions that the hearer harbors towards Remigio,
to gain the hearer's trust thereby, in order that Remigio might succeed in
deceiving the hearer about some more significant item at a future date.
These instantiations of cases (1) and (3) can be labeled (1*) and (3*), respectively. Renligio's present attempt at spreading the truth might thus be construed as a "loss leader." Under this interpretation of Remigio's actions,
case (3*) shows Remigio to be somewhat inept. But should any of these
cases, (1'), (1*), and (3*), be counted as cases of lying?
In case (3*) Remigio puts forward a false statement and Remigio has an
intention to deceive. One may be disinclined, however, to call this a lie, and
not simply because Remigio believes the statement to be true. It is rather
that the intention to deceive is not connected in the right way to Remigio's
present utterance. We might distinguish here between remote and proximate intentions. A remote intention is an intention presently held by all
agent, whose realization is at some time in the future, requiring a chain of
events to bring it about. We are to suppose that some of the links on the
chain are the products of other intentions of the agent, functioning as
means in service of the remote intention. These other intentions are proximate intentions, although nothing prevents some of them from being
remote themselves, relative to other, more proximate intentions on the
chain. It can happen that some proximate intentions involve outcomes
quite different in kind from the outcome envisioned in the remote intention. But the proximate outcomes are no less genuinely intended for all
that. Wanda's ultimate goal is to live a life of ease by the time she turns
fifty. She may nevertheless embark, at the age of thirty, on a career that she
knows will be fraught with hardships because she believes that the career
is an effective means to her goal. The proximate hardships are really
intended (but probably not really desired!) for the sake of the remote goal.
In similar fashion, Remigio's present proximate intention can be not to
deceive even though Remigio's present remote intention is to deceive and
even though the proximate intention is in service of the remote intention.
Thus if we think it is correct to clear Remigio of charges of lying in case
(3*), we should also think that Augustine's definition (D3) leaves the
notion of an intention to deceive too indeterminate. Although Williams
does not tarry to offer a rationale for incorporating into (D4) tlle constraint
that the intention to deceive must be directed at the content of the assertion, the incorporation explains how type-(3) cases can involve a false state-
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ment, be tainted with deception, yet not be cases of lying. And if case (3*) is
judged not to be a lie, it seems that case (1*) should also not be so judged.
That leaves case (1'). In (1') Remigio is counting on his hearer's distrust to
lead the hearer to believe of a true statement that it is false. A case of intentional deception, to be sure. But can one lie by telling the truth? While there
is nothing in Williams's (D4) that precludes the possibility, one might
think, reasonably enough, that Augustine's (D3) does rule it out. Yet it is
Augustine who tells us in passage (A) that a person can lie by telling the
truth. The case Augustine explicitly cited in (A) was a type-(2) case, in
which the speaker believes that what he says is false. But the rationale
Augustine offers for classifying case (2) as a lie makes it tempting also to
number case (1') among the lies: uFor he is to be judged as lying or not
lying by the intention of his own soul, not by the truth or falsity of the
things themselves." Has Augustine embraced principles that result in
inconsistency? On the one hand, (D3) requires a false statement, which (1')
lacks; on the other, passage (A) does not merely waive (D3)'s requirement,
it rejects the requirement.
One might try to reconcile Augustine's views by maintaining that
although case (2) is a lie by the light of passage (A), (1') is not. Before we
see an argument for discriminating between case (2) and case (1') in this
way, we should keep in mind that even if the argument is successful, we
have not thereby addressed the issue of how to square Augustine's verdict
in passage (A) on case (2) with his (D3) definition, which requires a false
statement, not merely a (true) statement believed to be false.
By hypothesis, in both cases (1') and (2) Remigio is out to get his hearer
to believe a falsehood. That may or may not be behavior for which we have
sympathy on Remigio'spart: it depends on why Remigio wants to deceive
the hearer and, in case (1'), why the hearer is distrustfu1. 9 Setting those
issues aside, we have to acknowledge in case (2) that Remigio believes that
he is telling a falsehood and that he intends to deceive his hearer about the
content of his assertion. By any reasonable account, everything internaZZy
required for lying has been met. It is just that in case (2) the world did not
cooperate with Remigio; what he succeeded in doing outwardly was to tell
the truth, unbeknownst to himself and no doubt contrary to his wishes.
That Remigio is not numbered among the liars externaZZy is thus a matter of
moralluck. Let us say, then, that case (2) is a case of an internallie. And let
us say that a necessary condition for an assertion's counting as an externallie
is that the assertion be false. This way of treating case (2) comports with the
sentiment expressed in passage (A). However, the internal cOl1.ditions present in case (2) are only partly met in case (1'). In particular, Remigio does
not believe that his statement is false. If we insist that for something to
count as an internallie, the speaker must both believe that what he says is
false and intend to deceive the hearer about the content of the assertion,
then case (1') qualifies as neitl1.er an internal nor an externallie.
It may have occurred to you that the notion of an internallie recapitulates Williams's (D4) and that the notion of an externallie picks up the feature of Augustine's (D3) not already explicit in (D4). That suggests putting
forward the following hybrid definition of a fuZZ-blown lie, a lie that is both
an internal and externallie:
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(D5) A full-blown lie is (a) a false statement, (b) the content of which
the speaker believes to be false, (c) which is made with the intention
to deceive the hearer with regard to that content.
Recall the tantalizing remark Augustine makes immediately after the presentation of his (D3) definition from DM 4.5, cited in passage (B): "But
whether this [(D3)] alone is a lie is another question." Augustine has special reason to regard intemallies as genuine lies even though they are not
full-blown lies or lies picked up by (D3). In De Cantinentia, a work written
shortly before DM, Augustine amplified his conception of intention as consent to produce an audacious account of sin. The amplification has three
components. The first component is that consent to something that is forbidden by God is necessary for a sin to have been committed. That is, no
sin is unintentional. The second component is that to consent to something
forbidden by God is to commit a sin, even if extemal circumstances should
prevent the consent from being translated into action. That is, to intend to
do what is forbidden by God is sufficient for having already committed a
sin. The third component maintains that one's consent to $, when $ is forbidden by God, convicts one, in the eyes of God, of the sin of $ing. That is,
if one intends to murder, for example, then one is guilty of the sin of murder, by God's accounting, not just attempted murder, even if the killing is
never carried out! (De Cantinentia 2.3-5.)10 We can now see why Augustine
calls case (2) a lie in passage (A). Even had Remigio uttered nothing, his
belief and intention in case (2) are sufficient to qualify hirn as a liar. The
fact that he actually uttered a truth does not alter the verdict, any more
than the fact that Jones unwittingly used a toy weapon would clear Jones
of acharge of assault.
Why, then, the emphasis on the official-Iooking definition, (D3), when
(D3) does not acknowledge the existence of internaIlies? The context in
which DM passage (B) is embedded makes it clear that (D3) is intended to
pick out only the most salient, public lies. And the practical and pressing
concem that dominates the discussion in CM, namely, the use of full-blown
lies to trap heretics, makes a discussion of intemallies something of a luxury.
I think the most sympathetic interpretation of Augustine's views on
defining the notion of a lie is that lies divide into two sorts. There are internal
lies and there are full-blown lies. Full-blown lies are defined by (D5), and I
suppose on Augustine's behalf that clause (b) and the more precise clause (c)
of (D5) are clauses that Augustine would be happy to add to his (D3).
Intemallies satisfy clauses (b) and (c) of (D5) but not clause (a). They can fail
to satisfy clause (a) in either of two ways. The speaker can say nothing or the
speaker can say something that is true, not false. Described in this way, internal lies can seem to be truncated, lies that never make the big time in the
extemal world. They are, nevertheless, in Augustine's view, morally serious.

Why Are Lies Always Wrang?
It is one thing to maintain that lying used to uncover heretics is wrong,
another to argue that all lying is wrong. Augustine espouses both theses,
sometimes relying on the second thesis to argue for the first. I shall begin
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by looking at his strategy for arguing for the first thesis, then turn my
attention to the second.
One way of seeing what Augustine is up to in CM is to imagine his correspondent, Consentius, putting forward or at least wondering about the
following Permissibility Thesis:
(PT) If x' s doing <p for the sake of '4' will have better consequences than
x's not doing <p, then it is permissible for x to do <p for the sake of '4'.
When the contemplated activity is lying for the sake of uncovering
heretics, Consentius might suppose that the betterment to be achieved is
twofold. Orthodox Christians will be insulated from the potentially baneful influence of heretics feigning orthodoxy while insinuating blasphemous
doctrines. And the heretics themselves, once exposed, will have the opportunity of recanting the heresy that stymies their prospects for salvation.
(PT) is not to be confused with cruder versions of act-utilitarianism that
maintain that if x' s doing <p will have better consequences than x' s not
doing <p, then x's doing <p is obligatory. It is not (PT)'s ambition to tell us
what our duties are. (PT) simply alleges a sufficient condition for an
action's not beiRg forbidden. Even so, Augustine rejects (PT) and, for good
measure, argues against the likelihood of the two supposed benefits being
delivered by a policy of lying.
Augustine's brief against (PT) takes the following form. There are some
types of action whose goodness or badness depends on the reasons for
which the agent perfornls them. Call these types of action "intrinsically
neutral." Volunteering to work in a soup kitchen is laudable if the intention
is to aid the unfortunate; an act of cynical manipulation if undertaken as a
publicity stunt. There are other types of action that remain sins no matter
what reason might be given for committing them. Let us call these types of
action "intrinsically sinful." Augustine's examples are theft, debauchery,
and blasphemy: the purpose of CM is to demonstrate that lying is also on
the list (CM 7.18).11
Before proceeding further, we should note that Augustine does not do
what we might have expected him to do-complete his taxonomy of actions
by specifying types of actions that are intrinsically good, good no matter for
what reason they are performed. It could be that, because CM is out to consign lies to the category of intrinsically sinful acts, Augustine saw no need
to introduce the intrinsically good ones. But I suspect that there is a deeper
reason. Augustine may have thought there are no intrinsically good actions.
Suppose that we try to name one. Surely working for someone else's salvation would be a likely candidate. But if I work for your salvation because I
think it will confer earthly power on me, then my action is tainted by my
(no doubt coniused and foolish) reason for acting. If this conjecture is correct, then there is a kind of asyrnmetry between the good and the bad as
these notions apply to actions. Some actions are intrinsically bad (or intrinsically wrong) but no action is intrinsically good (or intrinsically right).12
Augustine need have no quarrel with (PT) when '<p' and ''4'' range over
intrinsically neutral actions, but he will deny (PT) in cases in which either
or both of the variables range over actions that are intrinsically sinful. The
case against both <p and '4' being intrinsically sinful is obvious. Aperson's
stealing in order to sustain his debauchery is doubly wrong and two
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wrongs do not make a right. Consider now the case in which '<P' picks out
an intrinsically neutral act-type while 'lV' picks out an intrinsically sinful
act-type. Working in the soup kitchen in order to poison one of the customers might pass muster by the lights of (PT) if the customer is a fiend,
but will not be endorsed by Augustine.
Consider finally a case ll1 which '<P' picks out an intrinsically sinful type
of action, and suppose that 'lV' picks out an intrinsically neutral act-type.
Stealing from Peter to pay Paul is still theft, no matter how rich and base
Peter is or how poor and noble Paul is; circumstances and motives cannot
make a theft not to be a theft. This latter kind of pattern-----<t> intrinsically sinful, lV intrinsically neutral-matches lying for the sake of unmasking
heretics. Even if doing <p for the sake of lV were to have better consequences
than not doing <p, doing <p would remain impermissible, thus falsifying
(PT). Or so Augustine wants to claim. But there are two gaps in this procedure. He has justified neither the thesis that some types of action are intrinsically sinful nor the dependent thesis that lies are included among the
intrinsically sinful types of action. What we get instead are arguments
denying the alleged beneficial effects of heretic entrapment by mendacious
means. Those arguments at first appear to be independent of the argument
against (PT). In fact, they, too, depend on the thesis that some types of
action are intrinsically sinful. In what follows I shall highlight in boldface
the turns in the arguments that depend on the thesis.
Let us first examine the defense of lying that maintains that by exposing
heretics by deceitful means we prevent them from spreading their heresy
and provide the occasion for their reform. Augustine's attack on this
defense takes the form of a cost-benefit analysis. When heretics lie to orthodox Christians, feigning orthodoxy, orthodox Christians are not harmed
because what they hear is the truth. Orthodox Christians who lie to
heretics, falsely endorsing heretical beliefs, risk entrenching the heretics in

their heresy and winning new converts to that heresy, in direct proportion
to their effectiveness at deceit. Moreover, when orthodox Christians
reveal their true beliefs at tIle concIusion of a campaign of deceit, their
pattern of duplicity tends to confirm in heretics the erroneous opinion
that Iying is sometimes permissible (CM 3.4-5), along with distrust about
whether the orthodox are telling the truth now (CM 4.7). A comparison
between the sincere heretic and the dissembling orthodox believer actually
tells in favor of the heretic. The former merely (though perhaps dangerously) believes mistakenly; the latter knowingly broadcasts falsehoods about a
religion that confesses the Truth (CM 5.8-9 and 6.12)
The tally does not end there. Further difficulties emerge when we examine the heretic-hunter who knowingly lies. The content of lus lies will be sufficient to qualify them as blasphemy. It is no defense for him to say that he
was only pretending to blaspheme; that the words on his tongue were not
the words in his heart. As Augustine points out, it was not open to Peter,
when he denied Christ, to claim that he was only pretending to deny Christ
(CM 6.13). Augustine's point is worth arnplifying a bit. There are communication contexts in which the norm of truth-telling is suspended. Augustine
mentions jokes as an example (DM 2.2), to which we can add novels and
plays. Pretending is also one such context, at least partly so. There is a kind
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of pretending in whieh all parties affeeted are "in on" the pretense.
Children's play, in which every child pretends to be a spaee allen, or a student at Hogwarts School of Witcheraft and Wizardry, is a prime example.
Another kind of pretending, however, is unilateral. In an effort to impress
someone 1 have just met 1 might pretend to be a Nobellaureate in philosophy. If the person is not in on my pretense, the pretense is unilateral. Beeause
not all parties in unilateral pretending are on the same eognitive footing, unilateral pretending is more open to abuse and therefore to moral criticism. Its
eonsequenees to the factually ignorant victims ean range from minor annoyanee through humiliation up to loss of life. As the eonsequenees grow more
severe, the perpetrator's "I was only pretending" defense rings more hollow.
But apart from eonsideration of eonsequenees, the "I was only pretending"
defense ean be false, even when the speaker really was seeking only to pretend. Sometimes to pretend to <1> is to <1>. J. L. Austin pointed out that the only
eonvincing way to pretend to be washing windows while easing a joint is to
be aetually washing the joint's windows. And in some social settings merely
to pretend a show of vulgarity is, alas, to be vulgar. 13 The moral appraisal of
the perpetrator ean thus vary with the severity of the eonsequenees to the
vietims, but it need not vary only along that dimension. In particular, one
might justifiably regard the perpetrator's pretense as eensurable even if no
harm or embarrassment were to befall the vietim.
We ean now put Augustine's point this way. It does no good to try to
assimilate the praetiee of lying to hereties to a ease of unilateral pretending,
beeause to pretend to blaspheme is to blaspheme, and there are no circumstances in which blasphemy is permissible. Thus the lying heretic-hunter
places his soul in terrible jeopardy.
Augustine has more in store for the prospective undercover hereticdeceiver. Recall (PT). Hold ''4'' fixed to the act-type uncovering heretics.
Hitherto we have eoupled ''4'' with '<1>' when '$' was held fixed to the acttype lying. One of Augustine's strategies is to allow '$' to vary over other
act-types, such as committing adultery. If (PT) allows lying to capture
heretics on grounds of better eonsequences, then it also allows committing
adultery to capture heretics on the same grounds (CM 7.17). For that matter (PT) allows the commission of any intrinsically sinful action as long
as it has better consequences than not committing it would have. If we
now let 'lV' vary in tandem with '<1>', and assurne that some intrinsically
sinful action types are worse than others, we will get the results, according to Augustine, that in typical circumstanees it is permissible to commit
theft to prevent someone else from committing debauchery, to commit
debauchery to prevent someone else from committing incest, and to eommit incest to prevent someone else from doing whatever is worse than
incest. These are examples of what Augustine ealls "compensatory sins"
(compensativa peccata), sins a person undertakes to thwart some other person from committing more grievous sins (CM 9.20). The seductive power
of their aura of self-sacrifice is such that one can come to hold the erroneous opinion, not merely that they are permissible under (PT), but that
they are praiseworthy and justified in themselves (CM 9.20, 10.23). As a
consequence a zealous Christian may come to believe that undertaking the
sin of lying in order to prevent the sins that flow from heresy is either
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obligatory or supererogatory.
But this way lies madness. If compensatory sins are justified, then a conscientious person will find herself vulnerable to the tyrant who incessantly
threatens to commit greater sins unless she commits lesser sins (DM 6.9 and
CM 9.20). If she acquiesces in the sin, it is still a sin even though it prevents a greater sin from occurring (CM 9.20, 9.22). And she has sinned, not
the tyrant, although the tyrant may be guilty of aseparate sin of coercion.
But if she does nothing and the tyrant carries out his threat, his sin is not
imputable to her. Even if it is true that he would not have done'4' if she had
done <p, that does not entail that she is a partner to his doing '4'. As Augustine
points out, it might be true that the burglars would not have broken down
my door if I had left it unlocked, but when they do break the door down
because it was locked, I am not a party to their destruction (DM 9.14).
Augustine thus believes that he has shown that there is no obligation to
commit compensatory sins. He also argues for the stronger thesis that we
are obligated not to sin, even compensatorily. The Second Great
Commandment, that we should love our neighbors as ourselves, does not
require that we love our neighbors more than ourselves; the person who
interprets it that way "exceeds the rule of sound doctrine" (DM 6.9).
Augustine's point is that to sacrifice one's own etemallife by sinning, even
if that were the only way to secure someone else's etemal life-a circumstance Augustine is inclined to regard as impossible-is to treat oneself as
less than a child of GOd. 14
This completes Augustine's case against the so-called benefits of lying to
expose heretics. As I have tried to indicate, the case is shot through with
steps that presuppose the existence of a class of intrinsically sinful actions, a
class that includes all acts of lying. You will search in vain, however, in DM
and CM for justification for the claim that some types of action are intrinsically sinful or for the claim that lying is such a type. Why is that? I suggest
that for Augustine, the answer is too obvious for words. Both works were
composed for Christian audiences, who could be expected to be guided by
the commandrnents of love, to be sure, but also by the Ten Commandments.
I suggest then, that Augustine's opinion would be that the types of action
explicitly forbidden by the Ten Commandments are intrinsically sinful, that
what makes them intrinsically sinful is their being contrary to the commandments of love, and that what validates the commandments of love is that
they issue from a perfectly good and loving God. 1S
If this is the sort of opinion that Augustine would enunciate, then there
is an obvious challenge to it coming from within the ranks of conscientious
Christians. "On some occasions," some will say, "the commandments of
love dictate that we should lie. Even though we might concede that lying
should never be used to trap heretics, there are cases in which it would be
needlessly cruel not to lie. We adherents to the commandments of love
thus should view the commandment not to bear false witness to be compatible with the telling of some lies."
As if in anticipation of this challenge, Augustine raises the following
case. You are asked by a patient whose life is threatened by a serious illness
whether her only child is alive or not. You know that the child has died.
You also believe that if you tell her the truth, it will kill her, but, we may
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suppose, if you do not tell her the tnlth, she will survive. You can choose
among three answers, "He is dead," "He is alive," and "I do not know."
Any other verbal maneuver will be interpreted by the patient as an attempt
to deflect the question and thus as an admission that the child has died.
(Unlike the case in which an officer of an invading army of oppression asks
you whether you know the whereabouts of any freedom fighters, you cannot take the heroic high road and say "Yes, I do, but I refuse to tell you." If
it were given to the patient, that answer would inform her that her son is
dead.) So, you can either tell her truth, ensuring her demise, or you can lie,
aiding her recovery.
Augustine says of the arguments for lying in a case like this that he is
moved by them "more powerfully than wisely" (CM 18.36). The temptation
to lie in such a case is so great that Augustine himself seems uncertain about
whether he could resist it. One thing he is certain about, however, is that if
he were to succumb to temptation even here, he would be committing a sin.
Our imperfect human condition inclines us to identify the irresistible with
the permissible; to go so far as to identify failing to lie in this case with
homicide. These tactics are desperate exercises in special pleading.
Counterpoised to them and to the intimate awareness of our psychological
infirmity is our image of Jesus, from wh.ose mouth nothing false proceeded
(CM 18.36). To those who maintain that lying to the patient is not sinful,
Augustine's reply is sympathetic but firm disagreement. Still, some types of
sinful action are better or worse than others, and of instances of the same
type of sin, some are performed for better or worse reasons (CM 8.19).
Although all lies are sinful, some may be forgivable. So we should hope.

Coda
In a remarkable passage in DM, Augustine offers three possible glosses on
Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 7:13, "Refuse to utter any lie, for the habit of lying
serves no good" (DM 16-17.34). The Latin text that Augustine uses for the
first part of the verse is Nolite velle mentiri omne mendacium. According to
Augusline, on one interpretation, we have:
(11)

Do not utter any lie, and do not will to utter any lie.

A second interpretation maintains:
(12) Do not utter any lie except a lie that (a) does not pertain to religious doctrine and (b) is such that a greater evil can be avoided by
telling it than by telling the truth.

Finally, we have:
(13) Do not utter any lies that are forbidden but only those lies that
are permitted.
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Augustine dismisses (13) on grounds that its defenders simply misconstrue the omne in the Sirach passage as 'every' instead of 'any', thus supposing that the passage says 'Refuse to utter every lie' instead of 'Refuse to
utter any lie'. Augustine could subscribe to (13); it is, after all, compatible
with his view that every lie is forbidden. But that very compatibility testifies to the emptiness and indeterminateness of (13). (12) is certainly more
determinate. (12) wOl.:L1d allow for lying in the case of the ailing patient's
dead child but would disallow blasphemous lying. We know already that
Augustine rejects (12). His attitude towards (12) vis-a-vis (11) is revealing.
The Hebrew midwives who lied to the king of Egypt (Exodus 1:15-21)
found favor with God because their lie was motivated by mercy and concern for the welfare of others. Their behavior was evidence of progress
towards spiritual perfection. But it would be amistake to think that their
spiritual perfection would be aided by their cultivating a disposition to lie
whenever they find themselves in a position fitting the pattern of conditions (a) and (b) in (12). Quite the contrary. For, as the second part of the
Sirach passage emphasizes, "the habit of lying serves no good." (12) specifies a standard of truth-telling performance that many humans would find
hard enough to meet. Even so, its demands are not as stringent as those of
(11). For those who take seriously the injunction to be perfect, as their heavenly father is perfect, (11) sets the correct standard. The first part of (11) forbids all full-blown, (D5)-type lies, including but not restricted to lies
uttered to trap heretics, compensatory lies, and lies of mercy. In the second
part of (11), I have let velle stand as 'will', despite my earlier fussiness about
desires versus intentions. We can, if we wish, split the second part of (11)
into two claims, depending on how we translate velle:
(11') Do not utter any lie, and do not intend to utter any lie.
(11 *) Do not utter any He, and do not desire to utter any He.

The second half of (11') forbids interna!, (D4)-type lies, the lies that never
register in the public forum but are nonetheless known by omniscient
GOd. 16 The person who hews his behavior to the line of (11') will be charged
with no lies, full-blown or interna!. But if, as Augustine thinks, desire is the
psychological antecedent of intention, the person who satisfies (11 *), who
no longer has desires to lie-not even desires, too weak to be effective
movers to action-will have perfected herself even further.
Suppose that Remigio and Bernard Gui complete their pas de
deux without a false step: neither of them resorts to telling a lie. Should we
then conclude that nothing morally objectionable occurred in the interrogation? Remigio availed hirnself of some deceptive tactics. Is deception
always morally wrong? Consider St. Athanasius, who was asked by his
persecutors, who did not recognize hirn, "Is Athanasius close at hand?"
His reply, "He is not far from here,"17 gets high marks from the point of
view of truth, low marks from the point of view of candor. But to assess the
moral status of deception would require another paper, or book.
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NOTES
1. See Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 102-105. For useful discussion
of other approaches to the moral problem of lying, see Alasdair Maclntyre,
"Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Pmlosophers: What Can We Leam from Mill
and Kant?", in The Tanner Leetures on Human Values, vol. 16, ed. Grethe B.
Peterson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1995), pp. 309-361.
2. Written in 396. Augustine seems to have regarded CM as superseding
DM. See Retraetationes 1.27. But he also seems to regard the supersession as due
to an improvement in writing clarity, not a change in philosophical position.
3. Saint Augustine, Treatises on Various Subjeets, ed. Roy J. Deferrari (New
York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1952).
4. For details see my "Abelard's Ethics: The Inside Story," in The
Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeffrey Brower and Kevin Guilfoy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
5. See William E. Mann, "Inner-Life Ethics," in The Augustinian Tradition,
ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1999), pp.
140-165, for details.
6. Williams, op. eit., p. 96. Williams adds: "I. . . believe that this is what
most people understand by the word 'lie'; despite a very promiscuous use of it
by some theoretical writers, it seems to me that in everyday use this is clearly
its definition." Everyday users may be surprised to find out that by this
account they take as a lie a true assertion believed to be false by its speaker; see
the discussion below. In fact, it is a consequence of Williams's definition that
whether a person has lied does not depend on the way the world is; it depends
solelyon what is in the speaker's head. For reasons I hope to make clear below,
Williams's (04) is more Augustinian than Augustine's (03).
7. Such cases would include the student who, having no idea what the
correct answer is on a multiple choice question, picks one at random, hoping
that it is correct. I suppose fuat in an attenuated sense of 'deceive', the student
is trying to deceive the teacher into thinking that the student knows the
answer. The irony here is that if the student is lucky and picks what happens to
be th.e correct answer, the analogue in this setting to telling the truth, lliat will
go further toward deceiving the teacher than if the student picks an incorrect
answer, the analogue to lying. In any event it seems amistake to describe the
case as a case of lying.
8. This kind of case is suggested by some of the ingenious examples that
Augustine raises in DM 4.4. Case (1) also subsumes instances like Remigio's
equivocation, with the proviso that the speaker assigns to the statement a different proposition from the proposition tFie speaker hopes will be assigned to it
by the audience.
9. Having sympathy for an agent's behavior does not entail regarding the
behavior as right. Augustine saw this clearly; see below.
10. See Mann, "Inner-Life Ethics," p. 145.
11. Both claims run contrary to versions of act-utilitarianism that maintain
that the sole dimension upon which an action is to be evaluated morally is its
consequences and that (as a consequence) no type of action is intrinsically sinful.
12. If this conjecture about Augustine's views is correct, then Augustine is
committed to holding that Jesus' redemption of humankind was good but not
intrinsically good. Some of the sting of that judgment can be removed by
claiming that on some appropriate interpretation of 'could not have done otherwise', Jesus could not have acted for any other reason than love of
humankind.
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13. "Pretending," in J. L. Austin, Philosophieal Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and
G. J. Wamock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 207.
14. Secular analogues of this style of argument surface in Kant's second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative and in Williams's "A Critique of
Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bemard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and
Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
15. For recent variations of this sort of view, see Robert Merrihew Adams,
Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework Jor Ethies (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999); Philip L. Quinn, "Divine Command Theory," in The Blaekwell
Guide to Ethieal Theory, ed. Hugh LaFoliette (MaIden, Mass.: Biackweil
Publishers, 2000), pp. 53-73; and William E. Mann, "Theism and the
Foundations of Ethics," in The Blaekwell Guide to the Philosophy oJ Religion, ed.
William E. Mann (MaIden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming).
16. Thus I take Augustine's treatment of the Sirach passage to vindicate the
taxonomy of lies developed in the first seetion of this paper.
17. Maclntyre, op. eit., p. 336.

